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HAVE STATE JUDICIARIES BECOME LEGISLATURES
WHEN GRANDMA COMES TO COURT?: STATE
COURT DECISIONS IN THE POST-TROXEL ERA
Paula A. Lorfeld*
Set against the background of evolving technologies and
shifting societal norms, the American family has been redefined.
The traditional notion of a family has been abandoned as society
has moved away from a June and Ward Cleaver family model
toward an inclusive model consisting of one-parent families,
combined or mixed families, and even same-sex parenting units.
The transition reflects a rise in divorce rates, one-parent families
or non-marital relationships, stepfamilies, and the increasing
mobility of the average American citizen. In response to the re-
definition of the American family, grandparents have found
themselves taking on larger and more complex roles in the lives
of their grandchildren.' Instead of living autonomously from the
lives of their children and grandchildren where contact is of an
arms-length supportive nature, grandparents have taken on
roles in the redefined American family that range from com-
pletely absent to primary caregiver, and all levels in between.
As grandparent roles are redefined along with the Ameri-
can family, the rights of grandparents to obtain visitation with
grandchildren over the objection of parents has become an issue
of great debate. Disputes between parents and grandparents re-
garding the appropriate role of non-parents in children's lives
have surfaced in state legislatures and courts. 2 Many states have
enacted legislation that employs a "best interest of the child"
*Paula A. Lorfeld received her undergraduate degree in Psychology
from Gustavus Adolphus College in Minnesota. She graduates from
the Marquette University Law School in May 2004, and will begin her
professional career in June 2004, with the firm of Herrling, Clark, Hartzheim
& Siddall, Ltd., in Appleton, Wisconsin.
1. See Robert C. Paden, Jr. Child Custody and Visitation Rights: Parents v. Grand-
parents, 52 J. MO. B. 156, 156 (1996).
2. Kristine L. Roberts, State Supreme Court Applications of Troxel v. Granville and
the Courts' Reluctance to Declare Grandparent Visitation Statutes Unconstitutional, 41
FAM. CT. REV. 14, 14 (2003).
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test or a "harm standard" that attempts to weigh state interven-
tion on behalf of grandparents against parental constitutional
rights in determining the scope of non-parent visitation.' The
question posed frequently to legislatures and courts is whether
state statutes enacted to provide for grandparent visitation have
tread too heavily upon the fundamental constitutional rights of
parents to direct the upbringing of their children.
THE CRUX OF TROXEL
In Troxel v. Granville,4 the U.S. Supreme Court held that non-
parent visitation statutes were not unconstitutional as a per se
matter, but mandated that the statutes be applied with a pre-
sumption in favor of a fit parent's rights. The lead opinion in
Troxel specifically directs that non-parent visitation statutes must
hold a presumption in favor of a fit parent's judgment when
analyzing the application of the statutes. The Court relied upon
the central themes of its past cases such as Meyer v. Nebraska,
Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary,
and Prince v. Massachusetts, in which the Court validated par-
ents' constitutional right to direct the upbringing of their chil-
dren and restricted state intervention that would hinder such
upbringing.5 But, the Troxel Court did not direct an overriding
criterion that a court must employ in its ultimate decision with
regard to non-parent visitation. Although Troxel addressed the
"best interest of the child" standard and spoke to its inadequacy
if it lacked consideration of a parental presumption, the opin-
ion's vagueness allows state courts to resolve questions of
grandparent visitation on a case-by-case basis. It also implied
that courts have the ability to find a parental presumption in a
statute that literally did not include such a presumption. Thus,
instead of directing legislatures to redraft the non-conforming
statutes, Troxel has effectively allowed courts to construe legisla-
tive intent into statutes that never existed.
Given the less than clear standard that the Court relates in
that case, it is not surprising that state courts continue to differ
in their interpretation and application of Troxel. All courts seem
to cling to Troxel's holding that visitation statutes are not uncon-
3. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3(c) (West 1999), WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3)
(1993), 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/607 (2003).
4. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion).
5. See generally, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); 262 U.S. 390 (1923); 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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stitutional per se, but that the statutes must provide a presump-
tion in favor of a fit parent's rights concerning grandparent or
third-party visitation.6 Yet, many state courts have not called for
a redrafting of their visitation statutes in an effort to comply
with Troxel. Instead, the Court's holding has been interpreted to
vest state courts with a quasi-legislative role that allows them to
narrowly interpret their state statutes and read into them a pre-
sumption in favor of parents that was not originally intended by
the drafting legislatures. Thus, in an effort to find a state's non-
parent visitation statute constitutional and avoid a legislature
redrafting of the statute, the application of Troxel has vested
state courts with enormous discretion that prevents a uniform
standard for non-parent visitation to emerge across the states.
Troxel has effectively allowed state judiciaries to step out of their
judicial roles and into the roles of state legislatures. This discre-
tion leaves both parents and grandparents unsure of where they
stand with regard to their relationships with familial children.
This Comment examines the different approaches state
courts have taken in the analysis of their grandparent and third-
party visitation statutes in the post-Troxel era.
THE APPLICATION OF TROXEL IN STATE COURTS
In the post-Troxel era, state courts have found themselves strug-
gling with the application of Troxel to their non-parent and
grandparent visitation statutes. The courts analyze their statutes
for validity pursuant to their own state constitutions and the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As a result,
state courts have reached different conclusions concerning their
visitation statutes. These different conclusions can be attributed
to the different interpretations each court has arrived at as being
the law set forth in Troxel.
In the state court decisions discussed below, it can be shown
that state courts analyze their visitation statutes pursuant to an
interpretation of Troxel and reach one of two outcomes. First, a
court may hold that the non-parent visitation statute is facially
unconstitutional under the state constitution, the federal Consti-
tution, or both. Alternatively, the court may find that the visita-
tion statute is facially constitutional if the court holds that the
statute has an implicit presumption in favor of a fit parent's de-
6. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73.
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cisions regarding the upbringing of a child.
VISITATION STATUTES HELD FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL
In the first line of cases discussed, the state courts have held
non-parent visitation statutes, either in their entirety or in sec-
tions, facially unconstitutional in light of Troxel. In these in-
stances, the courts have rejected the statutes' validity and di-
rected the legislatures to amend the statutes to include a
presumption in favor of a fit parent to bring their non-parent
visitation statutes in line with the requirements of Troxel.
The Supreme Court of Illinois held section 607(b)(1)1 of the
Illinois Compiled Statutes, which authorizes grandparent visita-
tion, was unconstitutional on its face for lack of a presumption
in favor of the parent. Wickham v. Byrne8 is a consolidated action
where grandparents filed for visitation rights with grandchil-
dren. In the first petition, a grandmother filed for visitation
rights with her grandchild pursuant to section 607(b)(1) after
the death of her daughter. In the daughter's last will and testa-
ment, she expressed a wish for frequent visitation between her
child and her mother. After the daughter's death, the child's fa-
ther attempted to restrict visitation between the grandmother
and the grandchild and the grandmother filed for visitation. The
district court ordered visitation, and the father appealed. The
appellate court reversed the ruling in favor of the father, and the
grandparents appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court. In the
second case, grandparents filed for visitation with their two
grandchildren after their son died and their daughter-in-law at-
tempted to restrict the amount of time the children spent with
them. The trial court ordered visitation, and the mother ap-
pealed. The appellate court reversed, and the grandparents ap-
pealed. The Illinois Supreme Court proceeded to find the grand-
parent visitation statute unconstitutional on its face.
Interestingly, Wickham was not the first case in which the
court addressed the Illinois grandparent visitation statute. In
2000, the court decided that the statute was constitutional as ap-
plied in the case of Lulay v. Lulay,9 but the court did not address
the facial constitutionality of the statute as it stated that the
query was not before the court. In Wickham, the court analyzed
7. 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/607 (2002).
8. 769 N.E.2d 1 (Wl. 2002).
9. 739 N.E.2d 521 (Ill. 2000).
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the facial validity of the statute pursuant to Troxel. Section
607(b)(1) allows for visitation by grandparents, great-
grandparents, and siblings of minor children when a court de-
termines such visitation is in the best interest of the child.10 The
court identified the Illinois statute as parallel to the Washington
statute at issue in Troxel to the extent it was breathtakingly broad
and that the statute did not contain a presumption in favor of a
fit parent's decision." The court went on to state that the flaw in
the statute is that it "places the parent on equal footing with the
party seeking visitation." 12 Such a situation would allow the
state to infringe upon a fit parent's Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Therefore, the court found the grandparent visitation
statute facially unconstitutional and did not further consider
whether the statute had been unconstitutional as applied.
The Supreme Court of Iowa similarly held its grandparent
visitation statute to be unconstitutional after the Troxel decision
in two recent cases. In Santi v. Santi,13 the court examined sec-
tion 598.35(7) of the Iowa Code.14 The statute allows for an order
of visitation if the parents of the child unreasonably refuse or re-
strict visitation, if the grandparents have a substantial relation-
ship with the child, or if the visitation would be in the child's
best interests.15 In Santi, grandparents petitioned for visitation
pursuant to section 598.35(7) when the grandchild's parents re-
fused to allow contact between the grandparents and the child. 16
Unlike in many of the cases involving such disputes, both par-
ents of the child were still living and none of the parties were
even marginally unfit to supervise a child. Unfortunately, many
small and insignificant disputes over how much fast food the
child should have at grandma and grandpa's, whether the
grandparents could take the child to see Santa Claus, and who
would buy the child's first pair of shoes, escalated into the par-
ties coming before the court.
The district court held that the statute was facially unconsti-
tutional under the state constitution because absent a require-
ment of harm, it deprived parents of their fundamental right to
10. Wickham,769 N.E.2d at 7.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. 633 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa 2001).
14. IOWA CODE § 598.35(7) (1999).
15. Id.
16. Santi, 633 N.W.2d at 312.
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determine their child's upbringing." The grandparents ap-
pealed. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the holding. The
court held that the statute specifically contravened Troxel's hold-
ing, which requires a grandparent visitation statute to include a
presumption in favor of a fit parent. Instead, it allowed a court
to substitute its judgment with regard to the best interests of the
child.'" The court stated that because Troxel was unclear as to the
standard of scrutiny that a non-parent visitation statute should
be held to, it would hold that such an intrusion by the state into
a parent's rights specifically violates the Iowa constitution and
must survive a strict scrutiny analysis to be valid. 9 Therefore,
the court held that the statute was facially unconstitutional.
In a second and more recent case in Iowa, the supreme court
again held that its grandparent visitation statute was unconstitu-
tional on its face. In Marriage of Howard,2 0 the court held that sec-
tion 598.35(1) of the Iowa Code,2' which permits grandparents to
petition for visitation when the parents of the child divorce, was
unconstitutional. The district court initially denied the visitation
because it granted joint custody to each parent and the court
presumed that the paternal grandparents could spend time with
the child when she was staying with her father. Unfortunately,
the child's father did not get treatment for a substance abuse
problem and the contact between the father and child waned.
This alternatively affected the paternal grandparents' visitation
with the child, and they renewed their petition for independent
visitation. The district court then granted limited visitation, stat-
ing that the supreme court's ruling in Santi was inapplicable to
the case before it. The mother appealed.
The Iowa Supreme Court reiterated its holding in Santi, and
further stated that in the situation of divorced parents, the stat-
ute was also deficient because it failed to afford fit parents a pre-
sumption in their favor. The court held that to substitute par-
ents' judgment with the court's judgment is an infringement
upon parents' fundamental right to direct the upbringing of
their children. Therefore, the statute was held facially unconsti-
tutional and the district court's order of visitation was reversed.
17. Id. at 315.
18. Id. at 320.
19. Id. at 318.
20. 661 N.W.2d 183 (Iowa 2003).
21. IOWA CODE § 598.35(1) (1999).
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VISITATION STATUTES HELD FACIALLY CONSTITUTIONAL
The second line of cases that are discussed below demonstrate
that a majority of state courts have interpreted Troxel to allow
them the extent of judicial discretion needed to read into their
existing non-parent visitation statutes the parental presumption
requirement of Troxel. The courts have then found their state
statutes constitutional, but may find the statutes have merely
been unconstitutionally applied.
In Roth v. Weston,2 2 the Connecticut Supreme Court held that
its grandparent visitation statute was unconstitutional as ap-
plied. The trial court granted visitation to the maternal grand-
mother and aunt of the children pursuant to section 46b-59 of
the Connecticut statutes, which allows for visitation by relatives
if a court determines it is in the best interest of the child.23 The
mother of the grandchildren committed suicide, and the father
refused to allow contact between the children and the petition-
ers. 24 In analyzing the facial constitutionality of the statute, the
court stated that it had two options when addressing the defi-
ciencies of the statute with regard to the parental presumption
mandated by Troxel. First, it could hold the statute facially un-
constitutional and unconstitutional as applied. Or, second, it
could interpret the statute to be constitutionally compatible with
Troxel and parents' due process rights and allow the statute to
continue functioning within constitutional bounds. The court
chose the latter.2 5 The court construed the visitation statute to in-
clude a presumption in favor of a fit parent's fundamental right
to direct the upbringing of a child that will then be implicit in
the statute. 26 The court held that such construction would nar-
row the statute sufficiently to align it with the holding in Troxel.
Further addressing the application of the statute, the court found
that the trial court had not afforded the fit parent the presump-
tion required beneath Troxel and instead decided the case solely
upon a best interest of the child standard.27 Thus, the court
found the statute facially constitutional, but unconstitutional as
applied when a parental presumption was read as implicit in the
22. 789 A.2d 431 (Conn. 2002).
23. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-59 (West 2002).
24. Roth, 789 A.2d at 435.
25. Id. at 449.
26. Id. at 437-38.
27. Id. at 444.
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statute as according to Troxel.
The Supreme Court of Kansas visited the topic of grandpar-
ent visitation rights in Skov v. Wicker.28 The maternal grand-
mother and great-grandmother of a child filed a consolidated
motion for visitation with the child pursuant to section 60-
1616(b) of the Kansas Statutes. 29 The statute stated that grand-
parents and stepparents shall be given visitation without restric-
tions. The district court overruled the petition and the consoli-
dated action was appealed to the supreme court.
The supreme court analyzed the statute and found that it
could construe it to be constitutional beneath the parental pre-
sumption requirement mandated in Troxel if the court held the
statute contained an implicit presumption in favor of a fit par-
ent's rights when contemplating non-parent visitation.30 The
court went on to explain that it would construe section 60-
1616(b) according to section 38-129(a) of the Kansas Statutes,
which held that the visitation must be in the best interest of the
child and that there is a substantial relationship between the par-
ties.31 The court, deferring the parental presumption of Troxel,
instructed the lower courts to give special weight to the parent's
decision regarding the upbringing of the child. 32 Thus, the Kan-
sas court utilized judicial discretion that would allow it to inter-
pret the statute in a constitutionally valid light.
The California Court of Appeals likewise held that its
grandparent visitation statute was facially constitutional, but
unconstitutional as applied. In Punsly v. Ho,33 paternal grand-
parents petitioned for and received visitation beneath section
3102 of the California Family Code34 after their son died and his
ex-wife restricted visitation. The statute states that the parents
of a deceased child may have reasonable visitation with their
grandchildren if visitation would be in the best interest of the
child.35 The court, like the Connecticut Supreme Court, con-
strued the statute in light of the requirements set forth in Troxel
to find the statute facially constitutional. Specifically, the court
interpreted the statute with a presumption in favor of a fit par-
28. 32 P.3d 1122 (Kansas 2001).
29. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1616(b) (Supp. 2000).
30. Skov, 32 P.3d at 1125-27.
31. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-129a (Supp. 2000).
32. Skov, 32 P.3d at 1127.
33. 87 Cal. App. 4th 1099 (2001).
34. CAL. FAMILY CODE § 3102 (West 2001).
35. Id.
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ent' s decision. Upon application, the court held that it could not
rely solely upon the best interest of the child, but must consider
a presumption in favor of a fit parent to safeguard the parent's
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Therefore, the court held that
the statute was unconstitutionally applied in the superior court
because the judge did not apply a presumption in favor of the fit
parent's decision.36
The Supreme Court of Vermont upheld the constitutionality
of the state's grandparent visitation statute, but found the statute
unconstitutional as applied. In Glidden v. Conely,37 a maternal
grandmother sought and was granted visitation in trial court
pursuant to section 1011(a) of the Vermont Code.38 The grand-
mother in this case had been guardian and primary caregiver of
the child until the child's father was awarded primary physical
custody when the child was seven years old. Section 1011(a)
employs a best interest of the child standard in evaluating visita-
tion. The father petitioned the court to reconsider the visitation,
and his claim was dismissed. He appealed. The Supreme Court
of Vermont considered 1011(a) in light of Troxel and held that
the court could, and should, interpret 1011(a) to contain a pre-
sumption of deference to a fit parent's decision-making regard-
ing the upbringing of a child.39 Therefore, although the court
held 1011(a) to be constitutional, it found the application uncon-
stitutionally infringed upon the father's rights under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.40 In an effort to
correct the unconstitutional application of the statute, the court
reversed the lower court's holding and instructed that a pre-
sumption in favor of a fit parent be implicit in the visitation stat-
ute.
Similarly, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held its grand-
parent visitation statute to be facially constitutional in In re Pa-
ternity of Roger D.H.41 In 1997, Roger was the subject of a pater-
nity action. After determining paternity, the paternal
grandmother and Roger's mother entered into a stipulated visi-
tation agreement.42 Later the mother refused visitation, and the
grandmother sought to enforce visitation pursuant to section
36. Punsly, 87 Cal. App. 4th at 1109.
37. 820 A.2d 197 (Vt. 2003).
38. VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 15 § 1011(a) (2003).
39. Glidden, 820 A.2d at 204.
40. Id. at 207.
41. 641 N.W.2d 440 (Wis. App. 2002).
42. Id. at 442.
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767.245(3) of the Wisconsin Statutes.43 Section 767.254(3) applies
a best interest of the child standard and lists several other factors
that a court is to consider. The factors do not specifically men-
tion a parent's interest in the child's rearing. Upon petition, the
trial court vacated the stipulated agreement for visitation hold-
ing that the grandmother did not demonstrate that Roger's
mother was "unfit."44 The guardian ad litem appealed on the
grandmother's behalf. The court of appeals discussed the nature
of grandparent visitation in light of the decision reached by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Troxel. The court held that Troxel encour-
ages state courts to read in a presumption that a fit parent acts in
the best interests of a child and give such presumption special
weight.4 5 The court held that such presumption be read into the
statute and applied accordingly. Because the lower court did
not specifically read in a presumption in favor of Roger's mother
when applying the visitation statute, the court reversed the
lower court's holding and remanded it on the grounds that the
court had applied an erroneous standard. Therefore, the court
interpreted 767.245(3) narrowly to avoid facial unconstitutional-
ity as allowed by Troxel and established that the statute held a
presumption in favor of a fit parent.
THE POST-TROXEL ERA AND THE RESULTING JUDICIAL
LEGISLATION
Post-Troxel decisions clearly demonstrate that courts realize a fit
parent's rights cannot be eclipsed by a court's willingness to
substitute its judgment for that of a parent. The courts have
abided by this presumption even when they may implicitly fa-
vor a continuing relationship between grandparent and grand-
child generations. Yet, in light of Troxel's ambiguous holding
and its failure to specify how courts may come to a uniform cri-
teria when applying grandparent visitation, state courts have
found different ways to implement the central theme of the
Troxel decision.
As a general trend, it can be discerned that most courts have
expressed an overwhelming unwillingness to find their state's
non-parent visitation statutes facially unconstitutional. Of the
cases discussed above, only the supreme courts of Illinois and
43. WIs. STAT. § 767.245(3) (2000).
44. Roger D.H., 641 N.W.2d at 445.
45. Id.
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Iowa held that their non-parent visitation statutes were uncon-
stitutional on their faces because the statutes lacked a specific
presumption in favor of the parent.46 In contrast, the other state
courts, a few of which are discussed above, have merely read in
a presumption for the parent or even interpreted such a pre-
sumption to exist in their statutes. Thus, the courts saved the
constitutionality of the statutes and then struck down any appli-
cation of the statute that did not consider the parental presump-
tion.
One may then ask than whether this reading in or interpre-
tation of such a presumption by the courts is the most appropri-
ate approach. Or, is this approach merely allowing for a breadth
of judicial discretion that the Troxel court never contemplated? 47
These queries remain the crux of the problem with Troxel and its
holding's inability to create a uniform standard for non-parent
visitation rights across the states. The ambiguities that it has left
in its wake have made its application undirected for the most
part and left a place in state family law in which judicial activ-
ism has the potential to be extreme.
CONCLUSION
It is apparent that Troxel and post-Troxel decisions addressing
the constitutionality of non-parent visitation statutes have re-
sponded to society's growing concern that parental rights are be-
ing diminished as the demographics of the American family
change. The decisions demonstrate a deference that the legal
system has determined must be afforded to parents' rights over
the desires of non-parents. The mandatory parental presump-
tion that Troxel set forth for non-parent visitation statutes has
carried into state courts' decisions in an attempt to secure parent
rights, but Troxel's holding has left discretion to courts in deter-
mining the comprehensive analyses of visitation statutes. The
ambiguities of Troxel and the lack of a uniform standard for
grandparent visitation have ultimately disappointed parents
who believe that they have the ultimate right to raise their chil-
dren as they see fit and also grandparents who believe that they
46. Several other states have also found their grandparent visitation statutes to
be unconstitutional, including Michigan, but a majority of the state court decisions
addressing non-parent visitation and the application of Troxel have found their
statutes constitutional if the court chooses to read a parental presumption into the
statute.
47. See Roberts, supra note 2, at 25.
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have a right to a relationship with a grandchild.
With all of this said, it can be seen that Troxel does not re-
solve the status of non-parent visitation statutes and grandpar-
ent privileges. In fact, the breadth of judicial discretion that
Troxel seems to vest with the courts in their ability to read into
statutes legislative intent that was not part of the original draft-
ing will certainly not promote any emergence of a uniform stan-
dard for non-parent visitation analysis across the states. Only
time, additional legislative redrafting, and further judicial con-
sideration regarding the status of non-parent visitation statutes
will determine the constitutional rights of parents, the privileges
of grandparents, and a uniform criteria to be used in state courts
in the analysis of these rights.
